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NOTES
TITLE I OF PURPA. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL INTRUSION
INTO REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
Western economies are basically uncontrolled; critical economic
decisions are made by individuals pursuing their self-interests,
which results in unrestrained bargaining between buyers and
sellers of commodities. Both a competitive market and a system of
prices result from these independent decisions by individuals
satisfying their own needs. In two major sectors of western
economies, however, a competitive market and the resulting
autonomously determined price system are absent. These areas are
the enormous public sector, in which the allocation of resources is
resolved by political rather than market decisions, and the public
utility sector, in which the government through comprehensive
regulation controls the marketplace.'
A public utility is a firm2 providing an important service or
commodity3 regulated extensively by the government through
1. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 2 (1970).
2. The utility firm may be owned privately by stockholders, owned publicly by either the
federal, state or municipal government, or owned as a cooperative by its consumers.
3. Public utilities fall into two main categories: "(1) those enterprises which supply, di-
rectly or indirectly, continuous or repeated services through more or less permanent physical
connections between the plant of the supplier and the premises of the consumer; and (2) the
public transportation agencies." J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 4 (1961).
The salient members of the first group are firms supplying as, electricity, water, and tele-
phone communication. The transportation agencies consist of railroads, trucking, and in-
tracity transit systems. Id.
In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Supreme Court held that when private prop-
erty is used in a manner that makes it important to the public, it becomes affected with a
public interest, and therefore "grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good." Id. at 126. Although Munn concerned
grain elevators, subsequent court decisions held that other industries also were affected with
a public interest. See, e.g., Nobel State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1910) (banks); Cot-
ting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901) (stockyards corporations). Other
industries, such as suppliers of gas, electricity, water, and transportation, required govern-
ment franchises to operate because they needed special privileges. For example, these indus-
tries acquired the right of eminent domain in order to construct their distribution systems.
Consequently, by entering freely into franchise contracts that contained extensive proscrip-
tions, these suppliers subjected themselves to government control. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 1,
at 3.
Sixty-seven years after Munn, in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933), the Supreme
Court held in part that "there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a
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control of entry into the industry, stipulation of the conditions of
service, determination of rates, and mandates to serve all
customers.4 This extensive regulation results because public utility
industries require technology of production that leads to a natural
monopoly - A natural monopoly is a decreasing cost firm. unit costs
decrease as output increases over the entire extent of the market.'
When the entire market is concentrated in a single monopolistic
firm with decreasing unit costs, greater overall efficiency results.
The principal reason for the economy obtained by concentrating
the entire output of a market in a single firm is the requirement of
a large initial investment in long-lasting assets. For example, an
electric utility must build a huge electric generating plant,
construct a distribution system between the generating plant and
its customers, and install meters for every customer.7 Total costs
are fixed and do not vary with the amount of units sold, but their
per unit cost decreases as the quantity of the service increases,
resulting in what economists term economies of scale.
Economies of scale concomitant with a large initial investment
make competition wasteful in a public utility industry
Competition requiring duplication of facilities is inefficient; one
firm could supply the entire market demand with lower average
costs.8 When two firms compete, the output supplied by each is
insufficient to achieve the economies of scale that result from
increasing production in a firm with a large fixed capacity Thus,
the main reason for the regulation of public utilities is economic: to
public interest." Id. at 536. After Nebbia, the states could regulate all industries, not solely
those affected with a public interest. According to Kahn, this decision blurred the line be-
tween public utilities and other utilities, but public utilities remain a fairly distinct group. 1
A. KAHN, supra note 1, at 10.
4. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 1, at 2.
5. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 10-13; 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONONCS OF REGULATION: PRIN-
CIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 119 (1971). See generally Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regula-
tion, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969). Kahn has espoused several additional reasons supporting
regulation of public utilities. Most public utility industries, for example, require government
franchises because the various utilities necessarily use the right of eminent domain to con-
struct their facilities. This in turn necessitates a close relationship between the utility and
the government. 2 A. KAHN, supra, at 3.
6. This theory is anomalous because most firms experience decreasing unit costs over only
a limited portion of their output and subsequently experience increasing unit costs.
7. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 120.
8. Plants constructed for higher levels of output have lower average costs than smaller
plants.
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provide important services at the lowest cost.'
This Note will focus on the electric utility industry's rate
structure in light of the primary purpose of regulation. First, the
history of the industry will be detailed. Next, electric rate
determination and problems with the existing rate structure will be
discussed and several innovative rate design theories will be
analyzed. The focus then will shift to Title I of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA),1 ° a congressional response
to these problems that requires state regulatory commissions to
consider and determine for each covered utility whether
implementation of certain rate structure standards would result in
furtherance of the statute's purposes. Finally, this Note will
conclude by analyzing the effects of PURPA on existing rate
structures.
HISTORY OF THE ELECTRIc UTILITY INDUSTRY
The electric utility industry came into existence in 1879 with the
construction of the first generation facility 11 Reasoning that the
electric industry's transmission systems would require special use
of the streets that other industries did not, state legislatures
required electric power companies to obtain special franchises from
the municipalities they intended to serve.1 2 Because economic and
technological considerations at that time necessitated that
generating facilities be located near their customers, most
municipalities granted several franchises because of the
impossibility of one generating plant serving an entire city 13
By the turn of the century, more technologically sophisticated
9. Asserting that the natural monopoly rationale for the regulation of public utilities is
still valid if qualified, Bonbright has focused on the nature of the market, severely localized
and restricted, to distinguish public utilities from other industries. J. BONBMGHT, supra note
3, at 12-13. Other industries require huge investments in fixed plant capacity and operate
under conditions of decreasing cost per unit up to a certain point, but do not require a
monopoly of their market to achieve maximum efficiency because they can sell their com-
modities throughout the nation. Id. The market of a public utility, however, is limited geo-
graphically by the technology of the industry; the production facility of the utility must be
near the customer's home. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, 43
U.S.C.).
11. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. &
EcoN. 268, 270 (1978).
12. Id.
13. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 70.
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:491
transmission and generation methods developed, enabling the
facilities to transmit electricity over greater distances. Because
power plants then no longer had to be situated only in small
jurisdictions, municipalities lost the authority to regulate them.
Accordingly, in 1907 both New York and Wisconsin passed
legislation creating state public service commissions with
jurisdiction to regulate all electric utilities statewide.'4 Between
1907 and 1914, twenty-seven states enacted legislation creating
14. Jarrell, supra note 11, at 270. The Wisconsin statute served as a model for subsequent
legislation.
The Wisconsin Law (1) convert[ed] all existing utility franchises to "indetermi-
nate franchises"; (2) require[d] a certificate of "convenience and necessity" for
new public utilities; (3) authorize[d] the state commission to establish service
standards, to fix rates in accordance with accepted valuation principles, and to
investigate rates upon complaint and upon its own initiative; and (4) em-
power[ed] the commission to control the capitalization and issuance of secur-
ties by public utilities.
Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
Today all states have public service commissions. Generally, the major aspects of the reg-
ulatory power conferred by the state legislature to the commissions have paralleled the origi-
nal Wisconsin statute. Some provisions, however, have granted the commissions certain ad-
ditional powers. Legislatures have authorized the commissions to require the utilities to keep
extensive accounting records and file elaborate reports, including balance sheets, service per-
formance reports, and budget estimates on new construction. F WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 580-81 (1968). Additionally, any proposed purchase or sale of
utility property, or any consolidation or merger of a utility usually requires commission ap-
proval. Id. at 581.
Judicial review of commission action has progressed from strict scrutiny to minimal judi-
cial supervision. In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Supreme Court held that to
ascertain the fair value of the property used by a utility the commission must consider " the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount
and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of
construction ., and the sum required to meet operating expenses." Id. at 547. This typi-
fies the detailed determinations that the courts forced the state commissions to make for
each utility. F WELCH, supra, at 296. Thus, after Smyth v. Ames, courts carefully scrutinized
the methods and results of the state commissions.
In Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), however, the
Supreme Court relinquished its review of the commissions' specific methods, stating that
"[ilt is not the theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the
rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry is at an end."
Id. at 602. Hope Natural Gas initiated a period of broad administrative discretion with little
judicial review of the particular procedures employed by the commissions in making their
required determinations. For example, when reviewing rates proposed by the utilities, the
commissions are required by state law merely to discern that the rates are not unjust or
unreasonable. See, e.g, N.Y. PUB. SEav. LAW § 66(5) (McKinney 1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
193.03(l) (West 1957); Priest, Major Public Utility Decisions in Perspective, 46 VAL. L. REv.
1327 (1960).
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such public service commissions.'5
The superior technology that provided greater opportunities for
economies of scale in the generation and transmission of electrical
power also led to the financial consolidation of formerly
independent and local electric utilities.'" Small local companies
continued to interconnect and merge, forming larger regional
companies with combined financial and operating management.' 7
Seeking the advantages of economies of scale and more efficient
management staffs, public utility holding companies acquired
control over many regional utility companies by purchasing
sufficient stock in each to direct its operation. One holding
company, through stock ownership, thus could control many
electric utilities located throughout the country As a result of this
concentration, a few stockholders controlled the direction and
growth of the electric utility industry 1s
In 1929 the stock market crash and subsequent depression
brought financial disaster to the holding companies by causing a
twenty percent reduction in electric utility sales. 9 Financed mainly
by debt, the holding companies defaulted on their fixed interest
payments when their revenues declined; 0 consequently, many
15. Jarrell, supra note 11, at 270.
16. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 70.
17. H.R. REP. No. 496, (Pt. IV), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 8454 [hereinafter cited as House Report Part IV].
18. By 1932, eight holding companies managed three-fourths of the electrical generation in
the United States. Id. Numerous instances of corruption and financial manipulation resulted
from this concentration of ownership.
The orgamzers could vote themselves large blocks of stock as compensation for
their promotional efforts. Exercising this control, they could then exploit
the operating compames and through them the ultimate consumers by selling
equipment and technical, managerial and financial services to them at inflated
prices. They could bid up the prices of operating company assets by exchanging
them for securities of the acquiring company-securities that the investing
public gobbled up at inflated prices; and they could then write up the book
value of the assets acquired in this fashion.
2 A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 71.
State public service commissions were ineffective in attempting to control the holding
compames because they lacked the skill to evaluate the industry, or the resources or the
political power to dominate the powerful holding companies. Id. at 72. Moreover, in Public
Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., the Supreme Court held the states were with-
out authority to regulate interstate wholesale sales of electricity. 273 U.S. 83 (1927). The
states thus had neither the resources nor the jurisdiction to correct any of the egregious
practices of the holding companies.
19. House Report Part IV, supra note 17, at 8570.
20. Id.
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declared bankruptcy As a result, in 1935 Congress enacted the
Public Utility Holding Company Act,2' which established a federal
regulatory scheme to correct the abuses by the holding companies.
Congress granted the Securities and Exchange Commission the
authority to limit a public utility company, with exceptions, to a
single integrated generation and transmission system.2 2 By 1950
the commission nearly had completed the task of reorganizing the
holding companies, eliminating the unnecessary complication in
their structure that had provided the opportunity for corruption.2 3
Dynamic technological developments after World War II
occurred in both the generation and transmission of high voltage
electricity, enabling electric utilities to participate substantially in
the tremendous industrial growth of the 1950's and 1960's. These
innovations called for the coordination and interconnection 4 of
electric utilities to achieve greater economies of scale, but because
of the traditionally local nature of utility companies and the
Securities and Exchange Commission's prohibitions on the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970).
22. Id. § 79(k)(b)(1).
23. R. RrrcHiE, INTEGRATON OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES 25-33 (1954). See gener-
ally J. BoNBBmhrr & G. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY (1932); 7 B.C. INDUS. & COm. L. REv.
716 (1966).
24. Coordination of electric utilities can be accomplished in a number of ways, including
interties and power pools.
Interties are physical connections between systems, usually undertaken to
improve reliability and reduce generating reserve requirements. Today, there
are three separate power transmission networks that serve all of the contiguous
United States and parts of Canada and Mexico. One of these interties serves
the eastern half of the country, a second serves the western half of the country
and the third serves Texas. The latter is currently in considerable
disarray.
These ties tend to be relatively loose arrangements with the strength of the
ties varying between the systems. They are of critical importance in emergency
situations. Interties, however, require coordination of construction and operat-
ing plans between systems. The benefits from interties have generally induced
utilities to move toward creation of tighter coordinating groups, such as power
pools. A pool is an organization which regulates the generation and dispatch of
electric energy, to a greater or lesser degree, to all pool members in a effort to
achieve the lowest cost for the pool as a whole. Cost savings can generally be
achieved by operating a group of generating units in a network of interconnect-
ing transmission lines to multiple population centers as if all the parts were a
single system.
House Report Part IV, supra note 17, at 8571. See generally Fairman & Scott, Transmission,
Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 HAsnNGs L.J. 1159 (1977);
Miller, A Needed Reform of the Organization and Regulation of the Interstate Electric
Power Industry, 38 FoRnHAm L. REv. 635 (1970).
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development of new holding companies, utilities remain largely
localized. 25 The electric utility industry has accomplished limited
coordination mainly on a voluntary basis with only minimal
assistance from the federal government.2
In the past few years, the electric utility industry has confronted
the following major problems:
declining load factors,7 increasing fuel costs, rapidly rising costs
of new capacity, lower than expected powerplant reliability and
a virtual end to the economies of scale associated with increasing
sizes of generating plants. Between 1965 and the present,
the average national annual load factor has been declining-
reflecting a substantial reduction in utility generation efficiency
In the past five years the cost of fuel has risen approximately
400 percent, and the cost of gas, over 175 percent. Plant capa-
city costs continue the steep rise as evidenced by a 68 percent
rise, between 1970 and 1975, in the costs per kilowatt of new
plant capacity 2
The lowered efficiency and the tremendous increase in costs
experienced by electric utilities have serious ramifications. The
higher costs have increased dramatically electric utility bills,
particularly for poorer families, thus requiring them to apportion a
larger percentage of their disposable income for utility bills.29 In
addition, the reduction in efficiency has increased the use of oil for
electric generation, thereby damaging the national economy by
exacerbating dependence on imported oil. Moreover, the decreased
efficiency has resulted in the unnecessary expansion of utility
generation facilities."° These developments have created a
controversy as to the economic validity of the rate design theories
that underlie the actual rates consumers pay for electricity
25. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 5, at 73.
26. In an attempt to further coordinate electric utilities, the Federal Power Commission
has assisted in the establishment of nine nongovernmental regional reliability councils.
House Report Part IV, supra note 17, at 8571.
27. A utility load factor is the ratio of its average load or production to its highest or peak
generation level. A low load factor, a modest average load relative to the high peak periods,
is inefficient because the peak capacity seldom is used. A high load factor, average load
approximately eqivalent to the highest peak period, is more efficient because most of the
generation capacity is used continuously. See generally J. BONBIGirr, supra note 3, at 357-
62.
28. House Report Part IV, supra note 17, at 8572.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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RATE DETERMINATION
The procedure for determining electric utility rates is a
bifurcated process. First, the gross revenue required to reimburse
the utility for its costs incurred in supplying the electricity is
determined. After this revenue requirement is established, rates for
each class of customers are calcuated to generate that revenue. The
state regulatory commission must approve both steps.3
The gross revenue requirement consists of the utility's operating
expenses, including maintenance, depreciation, all taxes, and a
rate of return that the owners of the utility are allowed on their
invested property 32 Although the operating expenses are easily
ascertainable from the accounting records of an electric utility, the
calculation of the rate of return allowed to the stockholders of the
utility is more complex. First, a valuation of the owner's invested
property, the rate base, is determined. When computing the rate
bases, a formula of valuation is used to ascertain the value of the
invested property 3 Next, a fixed percentage is applied to the rate
31. Generally, electric utilities file proposed rate charges for each class of customers. After
a hearing with all concerned parties, the public service commission files a final order con-
taimng the rates it has determined to be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory
Rates are not unjust or unreasonable if the rate differences between classes are premised on
cost differentials incurred when serving those classes. New York, for example, allows rate
differentials between classes if they are based on the amount of the service used, the time
used, the purpose for which used, and the duration of use. N.Y. Pus. SERv. LAW § 65.5
(McKinney 1955).
The rates of an electric utility are unduly discriminatory if they grant a preference to one
class of customers over a substantially similar dlass of customers. The similarity between
customer groups is determined by the costs the classes impose on the system. Id. § 65.3. If
the utility incurs the same or substantially similar costs when serving different customers,
then it must charge those customers the same rate. Thus, the overall reasonableness of util-
ity rates is determined by examining the costs that the various classes impose on the operat-
ing system of the utility. Any rate differential between classes must be substantiated by a
parallel cost differential.
32. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTrxr REGULATION 45 (1969).
33. Commissions use three alternative measures of valuation: (1) original cost, the ac-
quisition price of the property; (2) reproduction cost, the present cost of reproducing the
property; and (3) prudent investment, what the original investment should have been. F
WELCH, supra note 14, at 269-72. A majority of jurisdictions use the original cost valuation
method while a minority of jurisdictions adheres to the reproduction, or fair value, theory. 1
A. PRIEST, supra note 32, at 139-67. When evaluating utility property, both theories concen-
trate on historical or sunk capacity costs, ignoring the future construction costs that current
consumers impose on the utility. This approach burdens future consumers with costs attrib-
utable to the consumption patterns of current consumers.
An innovative theory of capacity costing is the long-run incremental approach, defined as
the incremental cost of capacity and output reasonably anticipated to be incurred in the
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base, yielding the return that the owners of the utility may earn on
their investment. Although this return theoretically should be
roughly equivalent to the return made on similar investments in
other industries, the return m the public utility industry performs
the additional, crucial function of attracting additional capital
when additions to plant capacity are necessary '
Stated simply, the gross revenue allowed to an electric utility is
the value of its capital multiplied by a fixed percentage, plus its
operating expenses. After this total revenue requirement is
established, the second step of the process allocates the figure
among the various classes of customers.3 - Historically, this
apportionment to customer categories resulted from a block pricing
structure that provided additional electricity at a decreased price
in a step manner;3 the resulting declining block rate provided for
future. Morton, Long-run Incremental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity Part I, 97 PUB.
Urw.. FoRT. 34, 36 (March 11, 1976). Disregarding historical or sunk costs, the incremental
approach focuses solely on increased future costs with the objective of charging those re-
sponsible for the new capacity with the marginal or incremental cost of providing it. Morrs-
sey, The Changing Structure of Utility Rates, 97 PUB. UwIL. FoRT. 15, 17 (June 17, 1976).
Consumers imposing increased future costs on the system will be charged a correspondingly
increased rate for this consumption, thus giving these consumers the proper price signal and
tending to discourage wasteful consumption of electricity. For example, customers imposing
heavy peak demands on the utility, see notes 43-47 infra & accompanying text, will be
charged an increased rate reflecting the future cost of new capacity that an increased peak
demand causes. See generally J. BONBIaGHT, supra note 3, at 317-36; 1 A. KAHN, supra note
1, at 63-122; Cohn, Current Proposals in Rate Design, 96 PUB. UTm. FoRT. 21, 24-25 (Dec. 18,
1975); Kadane, The Legality of Marginal Cost Pricing for Utility Services, 5 HoFSTRA L. REv.
755 (1977); McKie, Time's Arrow and Marginal Cost Pricing, in NEw DMNSIONS IN PUBLIC
UTILrrY PRICING (H. Trebing ed. 1976). For a discussion of the problems in implementing the
incremental approach, see Ranniger, Electric Rates-Where We Have Been, Where We Are
Going, 99 PUB. UwiL. FORT. 29 (May 12, 1977); Morton, Long-run Incremental Costs and the
Pricing of Electricity Part II, 97 PUB. UTm. FoRT. 25, 29-30 (March 25, 1976); Cohn, supra,
at 24-25.
34. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 32, at 195. "Unless investors are offered utility opportunities
comparable with those available among industrials, they may keep their hands in their
pockets." Id., see J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 238-83; F WELCH, supra note 14, at 477-514.
35. Generally, customers who impose similar costs on the utility are grouped into the
same class, resulting in three basis classes: residential, commercial, and industrial. See note
31 supra.
36. Morrissey, supra note 33, at 16. "This block pricing was based on the threefold func-
tional nature of utility costs, customer costs, demand costs, and energy costs." Id. The cus-
tomer costs are costs that do not vary with the level of consumption, including meter instal-
lation and reading, billing, and construction of a distribution system of zero capacity. The
demand charge, on the other hand, is the cost to the utility of providing the plant capacity
to serve the particular customer. The energy charge is the variable cost of fuel necessary to
operate the generation facility. Demand and customer costs are recovered in the initial
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consumption of additional electricity at a successively lower charge
than for the initial consumption. Justified by the economies-of-
scale rationale that supported the existence of the monopolistic
utility, the declining block rate is cost based in that as more
production is concentrated in a utility plant with large fixed costs,
the per unit cost decreases. Thus, the declining block rate reflects
the parallel decreasing per unit cost.
Traditionally, the declining block rate has promoted
consumption of electricity, which maximizes the utility's profits by
using excess capacity in the generation plant. Recently, electric
utilities repeatedly have asked state regulatory commissions for
large rate increases. These requests signal the end of further
economies of scale and reflect enormous increases in fuel costs.37 As
a result of rate increases, controversy has arisen concerning the
continued economic justification for the declining block rate
structure, given its promotional effect on electric power
consumption, and experts have proposed several alternative rate
structures designed to discourage the wasteful consumption of
electricity through the use of price incentives.
Inverted Rates
One such proposed structure, the inverted rate, is the converse of
the declining block rate: the initial block is the lowest priced and
each succeeding block is priced higher. Arguing that the inverted
rate structure is cost justified, proponents of this rate theory assert
that growth in peak demand and exhaustion of economies of scale
in production have resulted in the need for new generation
facilities, leading to an additional rate base and finally higher
rates." Placing rising utility costs through higher priced, high
volume, later blocks is cost justified in that large consumers are
responsible for the costly growing peak demand. Opponents of this
pricing method, however, argue that growth in electrical
higher-priced blocks while later lower-priced blocks reflect only the energy costs. See Taub-
man & Frieden, Electricity Rate Structure: History and Implications for the Poor, 10
CLFAINGHOUSE REv. 431, 432-34, 437-40 (1976).
37. See notes 27-29 supra & accompanying text.
38. Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Reform: Taxation through
Ratemaking?, 28 HASTiNGs L.J. 1085, 1108 (1977). For an empirical afialysis of inverted
rates, see Wilson & Uhler, Inverted Electric Utilities Rate Structures: An Empirical Analy-
sis, in NE w DuasioNs IN PuBmc Uwrnrrv PIcING (H. Trebing ed. 1976).
[Vol. 21:491
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consumption occurs over the entire range of the rate structure and
not solely in the later blocks. Both small and large users thus
contribute to the need for additional generating facilities, and
pricing solely to discourage high volume consumption will not
reduce the need for additional facilities.39
A second justification advanced in favor of inverted rates is the
theory that a higher price for later blocks of electricity will
discourage consumption and promote energy conservation." The
consequences of attempting conservation through an inverted rate
structure, however, would be undesirable because the larger users,
to avoid paying higher rates, would produce their own power,
reducing the production and revenues of the utility 41 The loss in
revenues would cause higher rates for the remaining customers
because the utility would have the same fixed capacity costs and
less production concentrated in that plant, resulting in higher per
unit costs of electricity The failure of the inverted rate to
distinguish between peak and high volume consumption and the
loss in utility revenues when implemented make the rate an
unacceptable alternative to the declining block rate.
39. Herbert Cohn has noted:
The proposal for inverted rates violates three basis principles of rate making in
at least three respects:
First, lower prices in the initial blocks would mean that the low use customer
might never pay for the customer and fixed costs associated with the service
rendered to him.
Second, the higher use customer would be paying considerably more for the
kilowatt-hours in the later blocks than the cost of providing such kilowatt-
hours.
Third, the failure of one group of customers to pay the costs associated with
service to them would inevitably require the remaining customers to subsidize
the favored group. This might well be found to constitute unreasonable-and,
therefore, unlawful-discrimination among customers similarly situated.
Cohn, supra note 33, at 23.
In addition, a general price increase for large volume users with no reference to the time of
use will not decrease peak demand. For example, assume the largest customer of the utility
consumes all his power in the middle of the night. A price increase and a resulting decrease
in his consumption will not affect the peak demand because the peak occurs during the day.
Thus to decrease a peak, attention should be focused on the time of use rather than the
amount of use. See notes 48-50 infra & accompanying text.
40. Aman & Howard, supra note 38, at 1108-11; Cohn, supra note 33, at 24; Public Utility
Rate Reform: A Multibias Approach, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 365, 374 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Public Utility Rate Reform].
41. Public Utiltiy Rate Reform, supra note 40, at 374.
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Peak-Load Pricing
Peak-load pricing, 2 another innovative rate structure, allocates
higher costs and correspondingly higher rates to consumption that
occurs during peak generation periods when the utility is
generating near capacity Lower prices are assigned to nonpeak
periods when the utility has ample excess capacity 13 Electricity
produced during a peak period is more expensive than nonpeak
electricity because inefficient peak generation facilities must be
operated in order to handle the demand. Utility policy has been to
purchase facilities with low capital costs for peak periods, even
though these plants have low energy efficiency and require oil or
natural gas to operate;" thus, growth in peak demand requires
utilities to build new generation plants that are operated by scarce
oil or gas.
Premised on consumer willingness to respond to price changes
in electricity,45 the peak pricing system attempts to persuade
consumers to defer their electrical usage to. nonpeak periods,
42. Peak-load pricing differs from conservation-pricing schemes in that peak-load pricing
Ittempts to shift the consumption of electricity from a peak period to a nonpeak period,
while a conservation-pricing system is designed to reduce the total consumption of electric-
ity. For an example of such a conservation scheme, see Treadway, Energy Conservation
Rates for an Effective Conservation Pr9gram, 102 PuB. UTm. FORT. 16 (Aug. 17, 1978).
43. Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-load Pricing: Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 Wis. L.
REv. 47, 56-57; Lande, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Electric Peak-loading Pricing, 103 PUB. UTM.
Foir. 9, 9-10 (March 29, 1979); Teed, A Practitioner Looks at Peak-load Pricing, 97 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 26, 26-27 (Jan. 29, 1976).
44. S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7903, 7921-22 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
45. A consumer's demand response to a price change is termed his elasticity. A large de-
crease m demand m reaction to a small price increase is an elastic demand, whereas a negli-
gible change in demand in response to a huge increase in price is termed inelastic demand.
Inelastic demand, for example, occurs when the price of heroin to a heroin addict increases
significantly; regardless of the price the addict will consume the same quantity or more. The
demand for beef by most consumers, on the other hand, is elastic. As the price increases,
the quantity of beef consumed decreases because consumers will purchase chicken and
other substitute goods.
The elasticity of demand for electricity, central to any price-based innovative rate-design
scheme, is not measured easily. Lambert, The Elasticity of Electricity Demand: Hazards of
Measurement, 97 Pus. UTm. FORT. 44, 44-45 (April 22, 1976). One commentator has con-
cluded that the weight of the evidence indicates that consumption of electricity is responsive
to price. Thorton, The Effects of Price on Consumption, 96 PuB. UTm. FORT. 17, 21 (Nov. 6,
1975). See generally Coyle, A Note on the Price Elasticity of Electricity, 98 PUB. UTM. FORT.
38 (Nov. 18, 1976). If the demand for electricity at peak periods is inelastic, then peak-load
pricing will not defer electrical consumption from peak periods to nonpeak periods and the
purpose of peak pricing, to reduce the need for generation facilities, is frustrated.
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thereby decreasing the need for new generation facilities and the
wasteful use of oil."6 Additionally, the peak-load pricing scheme is
more equitable in that the consumers responsible for the rising
peak-load costs would be given a choice between paying the
increased costs they are imposing on the system or paying the
lower nonpeak price and avoiding burdening the system with new
construction requirements and the expensive use of fossil fuels.4 7
Thus, assuming a customer response to a change in the price of
electricity, peak-load pricing is a solution to some of the major
problems confronting the electric utility industry
Time-of-day rates are a specific type of peak-load pricing with
the peak period occurring in the daytime and the nonpeak period
at night.4 The resulting price structure produces higher rates for
consumption during the day and lower rates for consumption at
night. Consumers should respond to the increased price during the
day by shifting their consumption to the lower-priced nighttime,
nonpeak period, thereby reducing the generation peak of the utility
and minimizing the necessity of new construction.
Peak-load pricing theory and time-of-day pricing m particular,
nevertheless contain two major flaws. First, additional costs are
incurred because of the new meters required to measure time-of-
day usage. A cost-benefit analysis therefore is necessary to
determine whether the savings achieved through the decrease in
peak demand and the attendant reduction in the need for
generation facilities supersedes the cost of installing sophisticated
new meters.49 In addition, some consumers will be unable to shift
their demand regardless of the magnitude of the price increase. For
example, large industrial users who are required to operate their
plants continuously, or commercial users who supply a daytime
service such as subway transportation, would be unable to react to
a daytime price increase by shifting their demand to the
nighttime."
46. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 43, at 56-58, 68-70; Lande, supra note 43, at 9-10.
47. Lande, supra note 43, at 10.
48. Bossert, Defining Time-of-Use Periods for Electric Rates, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 19, 19-20
(March 31, 1977); Public Utility Rate Reform, supra note 40, at 376.
49. One commentator has concluded that time-of-day rates are cost-effective for large in-
dustrial users but not for the small residential consumer. Lande, supra note 43, at 10.
50. See note 45 supra. An example of such an inelastic demand is the eastern electrified
rail system. Richardson, Aggressive Time-of-Day Electric Rate Making, 101 PuB. UTm. FORT.
19 (April 13, 1978). For a discussion of other problems involved m applying the peak-load
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In summary, the precise benefits of time-of-day rates are
unknown. The enormous potential savings possible through
reduction of the necessity for the additional generation facilities
warrant further study, particularly with regard to consumer
reactions to changes in the price of electricity If projected
consumer behavior demonstrates a sufficient response to the price
increase and significant savings that exceed the cost of the new
meters, then time-of-day rates should be implemented. In order to
compel the states to ascertain whether customers will respond
sufficiently to time-of-day rates and other innovative rate theories,
Congress has passed a statute requiring the state public service
commissions to determine the effects of implementing certain rate
design standards.
THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY ACT OF 1978 (PURPA)
On April 20, 1977 as part of his national energy plan5' submitted
to a joint session of Congress, President Carter proposed the
reformation of electric retail rate design by imposing national
standards on electric utilities.5 2 Reasoning that individual states
have difficulty initiating such reforms because of competition
among themselves to attract industry, the President recommended
the elimination of promotional and declining block rates that make
electricity artificially inexpensive for large consumers.13 The
President also proposed requiring the utilities to offer time-of-day
rates and reduced rates to customers willing to have their power
interrupted at times of highest peak demand." The suggested
national standards constituted an infringement on state autonomy
pricing theory to the electric industry, see Wenders, The Misapplication of the Theory of
Peak-load Pricing to the Electric Utility Industry, 96 PuB. UTm. FORT. 22 (Dec. 4, 1975).
51. Other elements of the Carter plan included the following: a tax credit for homeowners
who installed solar energy equipment; a gas-guzzler tax on inefficient cars; a standby gaso-
line tax to be imposed if gasoline consumption did not decline; a crude oil equalization tax
to raise the cost of domestic oil; a revision of federal controls over the price of natural gas;
standards of energy efficiency for major consumer products; a federal grant program to en-
courage schools and hospitals to conserve energy; a prohibition on the use of oil or natural
gas by new fuel-burning plants; and increased funding for weatherization of low-income
homes. Wagner, Multiple Referral: House Energy Bill, 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 841 (May
7, 1977).
52. Id.
53. 13 WEEKLY Comi. op PREs. Doc. 566, 569 (April 25, 1977).
54. Senate Report, supra note 44, at 7918-19. See notes 48-50 supra & accompanying text.
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in that retail electric rates traditionally have been determined by
the states,55 but after making only minor amendments, the House
passed the President's initiatives establishing mandatory national
minimum retail standards for electric utilities."
The Senate, however, restricted the federal role to data
collection, further study, and advocacy of rate reforms by the
Secretary of Energy within the existing state rate-making
procedures, believing that imposition of national standards would
intrude unnecessarily into a traditionally state-regulated area.51
House and Senate conferees" then produced a compromise bill
containing no mandatory national standards, but including
provisions for the state regulatory agencies to determine whether'
the hypothetical adoption of certain standards was appropriate to
further any of the bill's purposes. 9 Congress passed and the.
President subsequently signed this bill, the Public Utility Regu-
latory Policy Act of 1978.0 Although it does not explicitly remove
rate-making authority from the state regulatory commissions,
PURPA significantly increases federal involvement in state rate
55. As a procedural matter, the federal government would become involved only if the
state commission refused to implement the provisions of the bill; substantively, however, the
federal government would usurp totally the autonomy of the state commissions by dictating
the rate theories that the commissions use in deciding a rate case. One commentator con-
cluded that the President's bill was an unconstitutional infringement on state autonomy.
Grainey, Conservation and the National Energy Plan, 11 CREIGHTON L. RIv. 1169, 1196
(1978).
56. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
57. Senate Report, supra note 44, at 7910-11. In addition, the Senate found that signifi-
cant rate reform already had occurred m the states without extensive federal involvement.
Id.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted &n [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7797 [hereinafter cited as House Conference Report].
59. Id. at 7804-05.
60. The President signed PURPA on November 9, 1978. Title I of PURPA, entitled "Re-
tail Regulatory Policies for Electric Utilities," contains the rate reforms discussed in this
Note. PURPA contains five additional titles. Title ]I, Certain Federal Regulatory Commis-
sion and Department of Energy Authorities, amends the Federal Power Act to encourage
wheeling, pooling, and interconnection of power. See note 24 supra. Title l, Retail Policies
for Natural Gas Utilities, establishes two standards for gas utilities for consideration by state
regulatory authorities. Contained in Title IV of PURPA, Small Hydroelectric Projects, are
provisions to encourage the development of small hydroelectric projects at existing dams.
Title V, Crude Oil Transportation Systems, attempts to hasten the development of an east-
west oil pipeline. Unrelated provisions are collected in Title VI, Miscellaneous Provisions.
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, 43 U.S.C.); see House Conference Report, supra note
58, at 7803-54; Alpert, The National Energy Act: Representing the Low-Income Consumer-
Part I, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 806, 806-12 (1979).
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proceedings by establishing new procedures that override state
procedural law, by requiring the commissions to consider various
federal standards, and by granting new rights of intervention
into the state rate-making proceedings."
Title I of PURPA12  consists of standards that the state
commissions must consider for each utility, the three purposes that
these standards are intended to achieve, the procedures to be
followed when considering the standards, and the establishment of
new classes of intervenors who may argue for furtherance of the
purposes through adoption of the standards." Two types of
61. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2621, 2623, 2631 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
62. Title I of PURPA applies to electric utilities retailing over 500 million kilowatt hours
per year.
63. Mississippi has filed a suit alleging that Title I of PURPA is an unconstitutional in-
fringement on its state autonomy. Mississippi v. FERC, No. J79-0212(c) (S.D. Miss., filed
May 7, 1979). Relying on the tenth amendment and article 10, section 4 of the United States
Constitution, Mississippi asserts that PURPA's required considerations and determinations,
and the concomitant expense of employing additional state workers constitute an intrusion
into the sovereign right of Mississippi to establish its own rate-making utility policies and
procedures.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme Court, premising
its decision on the tenth amendment, recognized that Congress may not infringe upon cer-
tain attributes of state sovereignty. The Court held that the congressional imposition of
maximum hour and minimum wage requirements on state employees would interfere with
"the state's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." Id. at 852. Thus, Congress cannot usurp the right of the states to provide tradi-
tional governmental functions. Historically, electric rate determination has been a state
function. In light of the Court's protection of traditional state functions, this precedent sup-
ports Mississippi's allegations.
PURPA, however, does not impose mandatory rate design standards on the states, but
rather requires the states only to consider certain rate design standards and then determine
whether implementation of the chosen standard would further the statute's purposes. See
note 67-71 mfra & accompanying text. Thus, Congress through PURPA has not usurped the
right of Mississippi to set the rates for electric utilities within the state.
Although the Court in National League of Cities did not base its decision on the precise
resolution of the factual dispute, the effect of the minimum wage requirement on the states,
it noted the significant impact of the increased costs on the functioning of the states. 426
U.S. at 846. Accordingly, Mississippi has alleged that Title I of PURPA "places an intolera-
ble burden of time and money" on the Mississippi Public Service Commission in its utility
rate-making function. Complaint at 9, Mississippi v. FERC, No. J79-0212(c) (S.D. Miss.,
filed May 7, 1979). The extent and nature of the costs and the attendant infringement of
PURPA on the functioning of the Mississippi Public Service Commission is a factual issue.
If Mississippi can prove that these costs are substantial and that they will have a serious
adverse impact on the functioning of its Public Service Commission, PURPA could be an
unconstitutional infringement on the sovereignty of Mississippi.
For a discussion of the uncertain implications of National League of Cities, see Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of Na-
tional Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
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standards are enumerated: section 2621(d) standards concerning
rate structure64 and section 2623(b) standards not directly relating
to rate structure, but affecting 'the conditions of service.15 Less
strenuous procedural requirements and more limited intervention
privileges are attached to the section 2623 standards than to
section 2621. Through adoption of these standards, PURPA
attempts to achieve conservation of the energy supplied by electric
utilities, optimization of efficiency of facility and resource use by
electric utilities, and equity in the rates charged to electric
consumers.
6 6
Rate Structure Standards
Six rate structure standards are set forth in section 2621. cost-of-
service rates, declining block rates, time-of-day rates, seasonal
rates, interruptible rates, and load management techniques.
Although PURPA does not require adoption of these standards, 8 it
does mandate that the state regulatory commission consider each
standard on a utility-by-utility basis to determine whether
implementation of the standard would further the three purposes of
PURPA. 5 Furthermore, PURPA requires consideration of these
standards after public notice and hearings, which must be initiated
before November 9, 1980.0 The final determination must include
64. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
65. Id. § 2623(b). The standards contained in this section are mastermetermg, automatic
adjustment clauses, information to consumers, procedures for termination of electric service,
and advertising. Id. For a full discussion of these standards, see Partridge, A Road Map to
Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 103 PuB. UTIL. FoRT. 16, 21-22
(Jan. 18, 1979).
66. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The purposes are general and little
legislative history is provided to define them more narrowly.
The conferees intend that it is not necessary that all of these three purposes be
achieved for any action to be considered as carrying out these purposes. Rather,
if any of these purposes is achieved and the others are not negatively impacted,
a finding can be made that the purposes of the title are carried out.
House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7803.
67. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
68. PURPA states that the states may implement any standard found to be appropriate to
further one of PURPA's purposes or decline to implement any such standard. Id. §§
2621(c)(A)-2621(c)(B). See note 93 infra & accompanying text.
69. House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7804. "[W]ould the implementation aid
energy conservation by consumers? Would it help the utility optimize the efficient use of
resources and facilities? Would it provide equity to ratepayers?" Id.
70. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2621(b)(1), 2622(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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written findings, be based on the evidence established in the
hearings, and be completed by November 9, 1981.71
Cost-of-Servwce Standard
The first standard in section 2621, the cost-of-service standard,
dictates that rates for each class of electrical consumers reflect the
cost of providing service to that class.12  Specifically, the
commission must choose a method of measuring cost that
"permit[s] identification of differences in cost-incurrence, for each
class of electric consumers, attributable to daily and seasonal time
of use and customer, demand, and energy components of
cost. 7 3 By mandating that the state commissions examine in detail
the various costs their customers impose on the system, PURPA
forces the state commissions to develop rates that reflect accurately
the costs that different classes of customers impose on the system .71
The purpose of cost-reflective rates is to give the customers a price
signal upon which they may choose between paying the increased
price parallel to the cost they impose on the system or deferring
their consumption to a time when consumption imposes a lesser
burden on the system.
After development of truly cost-reflective rates, the commission,
after hearing evidence, would make certain assumptions concerning
the consumer response to these rate changes. 71 In particular, the
regulatory agency would determine whether customer response to
these new rates would result in conservation of electricity, efficient
use of resources, and equity among ratepayers. Whether these cost-
reflective rates would promote efficient use of resources turns on
the degree of customer response to the rate modifications. If
consumers reacted to the rate change by significantly altering their
consumption patterns, then a component of that reaction would be
conservation. Another component would be deferral of consumption
71. Id. §§ 2621(b)(1)(B), 2622(b)(2).
72. Id. § 2621(d)(1).
73. Id. §§ 2625(a)(1)-2625(a)(2). See note 36 supra.
74. See note 31 supra. PURPA does not dictate that state commissions follow either the
original or the incremental cost theories. Instead, PURPA advocates a more flexible hy-
brid approach combining elements of both the original and incremental philosophies. The
conferees intended that costs be measured in terms of both future demands and existing
facilities. See House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7812.
75. See note 45 supra.
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to a lower-priced, nonpeak period when ample excess capacity is
available, resulting in more efficient use of resources by the utility
Thus, assuming sufficient customer reaction, more cost-reflective
rates would result in both conservation and efficient use of
resources. Even without a customer response to cost-reflective
rates, implementation of these rates would result in more equitable
treatment of ratepayers because they would pay the actual cost
they impose on the system. Therefore, even without a customer
reaction to the rate changes, the regulatory agency would
determine that cost-reflective rates further at least one of the
purposes of PURPA, equity among customers.
Declining Block Standard
Unlike the cost-of-service standard, which PURPA encourages,
the traditional declining block standard is allowed only if the
utility can demonstrate that cost actually decreases as consump-
tion increases. 6 Accordingly, PURPA requires a hearing to make
factual inquiries into whether existing declining block rates are
cost justified. The state commissions must consult detailed cost
examinations of different customer classes to ascertain whether
declining costs, the economies of scale, are still present in the
electric utility If cost increases as consumption increases and
economies of scale no longer exist for that customer class, then the
declining block rate must be eliminated hypothetically for that
class to determine whether this elimination would result in conser-
vation, efficient use of resources, or equity among taxpayers.
Assuming the declining block rate is not cost justified and is
replaced with a more cost-reflective rate, the extent to which
conservation of efficient use of resources would be achieved again
turns on the degree and the nature of the customer reaction to the
rate changes. If a significant beneficial alteration of consumption
patterns occurred, then the elimination of the declining block rate
would eliminate some of the wasteful consumption of electricity
that the antiquated declining block rate structure promotes. This
conservation, combined with a deferral of use from a peak to
nonpeak period, would achieve more efficient use of utility capacity
76. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see notes 35-37 supra & accompa-
nying text.
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and resources because less inefficient peak generation capacity
would be required and more productive nonpeak generation facil-
ities would be utilized. As in the cost-reflective rate standard,
even without a customer response to elimination of the declining
block rate, more equitable rates would result from customers
paying the share of the costs they impose on the system. Thus, if
the state agencies were to determine that the declining block rate
was not cost justified and hypothetically eliminate it, they would
further at least one of the objectives of PURPA, equitable rates.
Time-of-Day Rates
The third section 2621 standard, time-of-day rates, mandates
that state commissions consider whether the adoption of time-of-
day rates, which reflect the varying costs incurred at different
times of the day, would result in longrun benefits that exceed the
cost of implementing such a rate.77 The time-of-day rate structure
is a specific type of peak-load pricing in which daytime usage is
priced higher than nighttime usage because of the materially
higher cost of generation during the daytime peak period."' The
long-range benefits of such a rate are premised on consumer
deferral of consumption from the daytime to the nighttime,
reducing the peak daytime period generation demands and thereby
decreasing the use of inefficient peak generation facilities.79 The
major cost of implementing this rating scheme would arise from
the connection of each customer to a sophisticated new meter
capable of calculating consumption at different times of the day
While developing the hypothetical time-of-day rates, the state
commissions also must make assumptions concerning the customer
77. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(b)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
78. See notes 42-44 supra & accompanying text.
79. The House Conference Report stated:
The conferees intend long-run benefits to included savings by reason of using
less expensive, rather than more expensive, fuels as well as using more efficient
generation facilities rather than less efficient generation facilities. In terms of
metering costs and other costs associated with the use of such rates, the confer-
ees intend that the term "other costs" be interpreted narrowly and include only
those costs directly involved in using these rates (such as added costs due to
more complex billing services) and not costs indirectly involved such as the
start up costs involved in fashioning a time of day rate structure for initial
consideration in a rate case.
House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7812.
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reaction to increased rates during the day and the cost of the new
meters. Finally, the commission must determine whether customer
deferral of consumption to the nighttime sufficient to reduce the
use of inefficient peak generation facilities would result and thus
cause savings from implementation to exceed the cost of new
meters. Assuming that the benefits exceed the cost, the
commission then must determine whether implementation of time-
of-day rates would further the purposes of PURPA.
A substantial beneficial alteration of customer consumption
patterns would be necessary for the benefits of implementation to
outweigh the associated cost; therefore, this same factual finding of
the commission would lead to the conclusion that implementation
of time-of-day rates would promote conservation of electricity and
efficient use of utility resources. A portion of the modified
consumption patterns in response to the increased daytime price
would be conservation; the other portion would be deferral of
consumption from the daytime to the nighttime and the resulting
efficacious use of capacity Finally, more equitable rates would be
achieved because both daytime and nighttime consumers would
pay the cost they actually impose on the system. In summary, if
customer response to the augmented daytime rate and the
diminished nighttime rate were sufficient, then implementation of
such rates would further all three purposes of PURPA.
Seasonal Rates
Premised on the peak-load pricing theory, the fourth section 2621
standard, seasonal rates, permits higher rates for electricity
consumed during a seasonal peak period than for consumption
during a seasonal nonpeak period." Anticipating this price
modification, customers could choose to defer or decrease their
consumption of electricity Consumers, however, would find
deferral of consumption more difficult in a seasonal rating scheme
than m a time-of-day scheme because a seasonal rate design
requires a customer to defer his usage several months whereas the
80. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The seasonal peak period depends
on the climate. In warm climates the peak period occurs in the summer because of the oper-
ation of air conditioners. In colder climates the peak may be either winter or summer de-
pending on the main power source of winter heating. If electricity supplies most of the heat
during the winter, then the peak is in the coldest part of the winter.
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time-of-day structure encourages customers to defer consumption
only a few hours. Time-of-day rates therefore offer a better solution
to the growing peak demand problem than seasonal rates because
consumers are more able to defer their consumption in the time-of-
day scheme than m the seasonal rating scheme. Unlike the
adoption of time-of-day rates, however, implementation of seasonal
rates would not necessitate the installation of new meters because
'existing meters can measure seasonal usage."1
To make the required determination, commissions therefore
must construct seasonal rates and make assumptions concerning
the consumer response to such a rate modification. If the
commission would assume a significant alteration in customer
consumption patterns, then a portion of that alteration would be
conservation of electricity The other portion would be deferral of
consumption from the seasonal peak period to the seasonal
nonpeak period, resulting in the more efficient use of utility
capacity Moreover, more equitable rates would result because both
seasonal peak and nonpeak consumers would pay the cost they
impose on the utility Thus, if a significant change in consumption
occurred m response to the increased seasonal peak price,
implementation of such a standard would further all three purposes
of PURPA.
Interruptible Rates
The fifth PURPA rate structure standard is the interruptible rate
scheme.82 An interruptible rate is a reduced rate to a customer
willing to have his consumption decreased or terminated during a
peak demand period, thereby minimizing the necessity of using the
wasteful peak generation facilities. As with the seasonal rate
81. The House Conference Report noted:
The standard concerning seasonal rates does not contain any qualification re-
flecting cost effectiveness. The cost of reflecting seasonal variations in cost does
not involve the use of time of day metering equipment or other expenses at the
consumer's end of the line. However, State Regulatory authorities may
choose to disregard insignificant seasonal variations in costs of providing elec-
trc service. A variation of the rates based upon these insignificant variations in
costs is not necessary to reflect costs accurately to consumers or otherwise carry
out the purposes of this title.
House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7807-08.
82. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see Public Utility Rate Reform,
supra note 40, at 382-83.
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determination, interruptible rate determination would involve no
cost-benefit analysis because only negligible implementation costs
are associated with interruptible rates. Unlike seasonal rates,
however, interruptible rates would allow the utility to control the
change in consumption patterns by consumers. When the utility
experienced a peak period, it would terminate service to those
customers with interruptible rates, thereby reducing the peak
generation demand. Thus, the interruptible rate would be a highly
reliable method of reducing the peak load of the utility
In considering the effects of this rate, the regulatory agencies
first would create interruptible rates and then estimate the number
of customers willing to accept diminished service for a reduced
price. If the agency found that a significant number of customers
would accept this decreased rate, then implementation would
further all of the purposes of PURPA.
Under this pricing scheme, if the utility experienced a growing
peak period, it could terminate service to all customers who
accepted the interruptible rate, thereby forcing conservation of
electricity Furthermore, through the termination of a portion of its
peak generation demand, the utility would realize more economical
use of resources because the necessity of using expensive peak
generation facilities would be attenuated. Additionally, more
equitable rates would result from the adoption of an interruptible
rate because each customer would pay the actual cost that he
imposed on the system. If the customer chose the higher
noninterruptible rate, his rate would reflect the higher cost
associated with his peak generation demands. On the other hand, if
he accepted the reduced quality of service and the concomitant
lower rate, his rate would parallel the lower cost that attends
nonpeak usage. Thus, if the commission determined that a
significant number of customers would accept the interruptible
rate, then it would conclude that implementation would further the
purposes of PURPA.
Load Management Techniques
The final rate structure standard, the use of load management
techniques,1 includes the implementation of "any technique (other
than a time-of-day or seasonal rate) to reduce the maximum
83. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(3)(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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kilowatt demand on the electric utility "84 An example of a load
management technique is a device installed on a water heater to
terminate electric service temporarily when the utility is
experiencing a peak period. 5 This results in a decreased peak
demand, thereby reducing the need to operate the costly peak
generation facilities. To make the determination required by
PURPA, a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one employed for
time-of-day rates is required.
The cost associated with implementing a load management
technique would be the expense of the device and its installation;
the benefits of implementing this standard would depend upon the
number of people willing to have the device installed on their
heaters. As with the interruptible rate, when the utility
experienced a peak-demand period, it would terminate electrical
service temporarily to those customers. In the load management
technique situation, however, the utility would terminate
electricity only to the customer's water heater, not his entire
household as in the interruptible rate situation. The ability of the
utility to reduce a portion of its peak demand would make the
described load management technique a valuable rate standard to
electric utilities.
If the commission concluded that the benefits outweighed the
cost, then it would determine that implementation would further
the purposes of PURPA. The termination of electrical service
during a peak would conserve electricity, and utility capacity and
resources would be employed more efficaciously because use of
expensive peak facilities would decrease. In addition, more
equitable rates would result because customers who chose to have
this device installed on their water heaters would pay less for their
electricity because of temporary termination of electricity at peak
periods. Thus, if the commission determined that the benefits from
implementation of a load management technique-for example, a
device to terminate electrical service to a water heater-exceeded
the cost associated with implementation, then it would determine
that implementation would further the purposes of PURPA.
84. Id. § 2602(8).
85. Nordin, Residential Electric Load Control and Time-of-Use Pricing, 102 PUB. UTU.
FORT. 16, 18 (July 20, 1978). See also Malko & Uhler, The Rate Design Study, Helping
Evaluate Load Management, 104 PUB. UTiL. FORT. 11 (Oct. 11, 1979).
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Procedural Provisions of PURPA
PURPA grants to any affected electric utility, any electric utility
customer of an affected utility, and the Secretary of Energy the
right to intervene in any ongoing rate-makmg proceeding and to
initiate consideration of the standards. 8 Public notice of the
upcoming proceeding must be provided to afford all eligible
intervenors an opportunity to be present. 7 At the proceeding, all
participants must have the opportunity to present direct and
rebuttal evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. Thus, the state
rate-making proceeding, in effect, is a full hearing with direct and
rebuttal evidence offered by all parties. This evidence is to consist
of detailed studies and the testimony of expert witnesses
concerning the appropriateness of implementing a rate structure
standard. For example, industrialists may present evidence that
time-of-day rates are inappropriate because the fixed nature of
their production processes prevents any shifts in their demand. In
addition, small residential consumers may challenge the
industrialists' conclusions and offer evidence demonstrating that
the implementation of time-of-day rates is cost effective, because
residential consumers can defer their consumption more easily
The Secretary of Energy and the utility may offer testimony re-
flecting their views on the appropriateness of implementing time-
of-day rates. After reviewing all the testimony, the commission
issues a written determination containing its finding of whether
implementation of the standard would further the purposes of
PURPA.89
Any participant subsequently challenging the validity of the
commission's final determination in state court would have a
substantial burden of proof. The applicable law would be state
administrative law,"°  which typically provides that the
commission's factual findings must be based on the record and
supported by substantial evidence." State courts have interpreted
86. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
87. Id. § 2621(b).
88. Id. § 2602(6)(A)(ii).
89. Id. §§ 2602(6)(A)(iii), 2621(a).
90. "State law governs on such matters as burden of proof, standard for review in state
courts, and in any other matters not inconsistent with the requirements of this title." House
Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7806.
91. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 30A, § 14(7)(e) (West 1979); VA. CODE § 9-6.14:17
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the substantial evidence standard broadly, and thus have granted
state regulatory commissions extensive discretion when deciding
factual issues. As long as some evidence supports the commission's
finding, courts will not usurp the authority of the regulatory
commission by substituting their own judgment for that of the
commission.2 Thus, to overturn a commission finding, the
participant would face the formidable burden of proving that no
evidence was presented to support the commission's finding.
When applied to the determinations required by PURPA, the
substantial evidence standard of review allows state commissions
great discretion in deciding whether implementation of a section
2621 structure standard is appropriate to further the purposes of
PURPA. The breadth of the commission's discretion is a function
of the complexity of the factual issues involved in the consideration
of the particular standard. The complexity of the factual questions
ranges from the relatively simple consideration in the interruptible
rate standard of the number of customers willing to accept the
reduced rate, to the extensive cost-benefit analysis required for the
time-of-day and load management technique standards. As the
complexity and number of factual issues in a rate structure
consideration increases, the quantity of evidence offered by all
interested intervenors increases, thereby increasing the possible
grounds to support a commission determination under the
substantial evidence standard. Thus, the more complex the
consideration of a rate structure, the more evidence the record will
contain to support a commission decision either to implement or
reject a standard.
IMPACT OF PURPA ON EXISTING RATE DESIGN
When the state commissions make the above determinations,
PURPA grants interested parties the right to intervene in the
proceeding and requires that the commissions follow certain
procedures. PURPA states that the state commission may
implement any standard found to further conservation, efficient
(Repl. Vol. 1978).
92. See, e.g., Commissioner Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Cason, 34 Md. App. 487, 368
A.2d 1067 (1977); Duato v. Commission of Pub. Welfare, 352 Mass. 635, 270 N.E.2d 782
(1971); Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 Minn. 241, 190 N.W.2d 661
(1971); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, N.J. Traffic Div., 5 N.J. 354,
75 A.2d 721 (1950).
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use of resources, or equity among ratepayers, or may decline to
implement any such standard.93 The intent of PURPA is not to
override the discretion of the state regulatory commissions in
deciding the appropriate rate structure for their states. The
conferees intended that PURPA supplement state law; that is, it
should provide a basis for implementing a standard when state law
furnishes inadequate authority They noted in their report that
"[i]n effect the three purposes of the title expand the discretion of
the state regulatory authority to adopt the standards of
section 111."" Thus Congress intended that when the state
commission made a determination that implementation of a rate
structure standard would further conservation, efficient use of
resources, or equity among ratepayers, and state law provided
insufficient authority for the commission to adopt the standard,
then PURPA would provide additional authority to implement that
standard.
The situation in which state law would provide insufficient
authority for implementation of a section 2621 rate structure
standard is difficult to imagine. Typical state law provides the
commission with broad discretion to set rates, limited only by the
requirement that the rates must be reasonable, just, and not
unduly discriminating. Generally, rates meet these requirements
if they are premised on cost." This result is precisely the intent of
the section 2621 standards, to base electric utility rates on the cost
of supplying the electricity. Each proposed rate standard attempts
to charge customers the exact burden that they impose on the
system, particularly at times of utility peak generation demand.97
Existing state law provides the commissions with ample authority
to premise utility rates on the cost of service by enacting the
section 2621 standards without PURPA's supplemental discre-
tionary authority
The objectives of PURPA become irrelevant when considering
the effect of these required determinations on a state's existing rate
93. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
94. House Conference Report, supra note 58, at 7805.
95. See note 31 supra.
96. Id.
97. For example, the time.of-day rate standard charges the daytime customer a higher
rate than the nighttime user, reflecting the higher peak generation costs incurred during the
day.
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structure. The underlying determination of the cost effectiveness of
the standard is dispositive; in this intermediate determination the
commission has broad discretion to make a finding because it is
unguided by any prior factual findings. For example, in considering
the cost effectiveness of interruptible rates, the commission would
not embark on a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the commission
would rely on an initial assumption concerning the number of
people willing to accept such a rate. The final determination of the
standard's furtherance of PURPA's purposes is controlled by this
determination. Additionally, in light of state law, this underlying
intermediate determination would dictate whether actual
implementation of the standard would be required.
If the commission determined that the standard was cost
effective, then the purposes of PURPA would be achieved and state
law would require implementation of that standard. If, for
example, declining block rates were found not to be cost justified,
then their elimination and replacement would further PURPA's
purposes. Additionally, state law that provides that rate
differentials be based on cost would require the elimination of the
declining block rate. Any other course of action by the commission
would be an abuse of discretion and unlawful because rate
differentials no longer would be based on the parallel cost
differentials. Thus, once the commission made a favorable
determination on the cost effectiveness of a standard, state law
would require its implementation.
The commission could avoid this mandated implementation of
the standard simply by using its broad discretionary powers and
finding that the standard was not cost effective. That standard
therefore is infeasible; implementation of a noncost-justified rate
structure is not mandated by state law For example, if the
commission initially determined that the declining block rate was
cost justified, then the standard of elimination of the declining
block rate would be infeasible and nothing in state law would
mandate its implementation. In summary, the underlying factual
inquiry into the cost relatedness of the standard is the dispositive
determination of the commission upon which furtherance of
PURPA's purposes and actual implementation of the standard
hinges.
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CONCLUSION
The electric utility industry is experiencing serious problems
caused mainly by the inability of the existing rate structure to
defer growing peak demand. Growing peak demand is deleterious
because it necessitates the operation of inefficient peak generation
facilities, which operate on scarce oil. In addition, this continually
growing peak demand augments the need for the construction of
new generation plants. In response to these problems, several
innovative rate design standards have been developed to defer
consumption from expensive peak generation periods to less costly
nonpeak generation periods. PURPA, a federal statute, requires
that state utility regulatory commissions consider these innovative
rate designs.
Rather than mandating implementation of these rate designs,
PURPA merely obligates that state commissions determine
whether the implementation of the rate design would result in
conservation of electricity, effective use of utility resources, and
equity among ratepayers. In order to make these required
determinations, the state regulatory commissions must make
assumptions concerning the cost of implementing the particular
standard, the consumer response to the new rate, and the benefits
from the altered consumption patterns. State administrative law
grants the commissions broad discretion in deciding factual issues;
therefore, because of the large quantity of variant evidence offered
by all interested parties, the commissions will have nearly total
discretion in determining whether a standard is cost effective.
Cost-effective standards further PURPA's purposes, and actual
implementation of such standards is mandated by state law
Because the determination of the standard's cost effectiveness
controls whether actual implementation of the standard will occur,
and because the commissions have nearly total discretion in
making this determination, the state commissions have wide
latitude in determining whether actual implementation will occur.
The actual impact of PURPA on existing rate design therefore will
be negligible, because the state regulatory commissions retain the
discretionary power to continue existing rate design.
TIMOTHY P DILLON
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